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 State-led Transborder Industrialization in Asia: A Note 
on Singapore’s Manufacturing Enclaves in Vietnam and 
China 
 
 
Caroline Yeoh and Wilfred How Pow Ngee 
 
 
State-led, market-driven interventions have been the 
hallmark of the Singapore `success story’. This paper revisits 
Singapore’s state-enterprise strategy and takes a closer look 
at the portability of this strategy, in the framework of 
Regionalization21, a series of transborder industrialization 
experiments in Indonesia, Vietnam and China. These state-
engineered projects, orchestrated to encapsulate economic 
space for Singapore-based firms to expand into the region, 
remain controversial. This strategic initiative is promulgated 
on the exportability of Singapore’s state credibility, systemic 
and operational efficiencies as well as technological 
competencies, to locations where these attributes are less 
distinct. We present evidence culled from surveys and 
interviews conducted in the Singapore-styled industrial-
townships in Vietnam and China. Our results suggest that, 
while the parks have arguably been a measured success, the 
advantages supposedly created by the abovementioned export 
of Singapore’s competencies have proven either illusionary or 
far less significant than originally envisioned, vis-à-vis more 
practical economic and competitive concerns. 
 
Fields of Research: Transborder Industrialization; Regionalization; State-led 
intervention 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Rising from the tatters of the post-colonial era to become an important base 
for multinational manufacturing in the region, the city-state of Singapore was 
once described as the most successful economy among the four East Asian 
dragons (Giordano and Kato, 1993); a title far from undeserved, given the city-
state’s unprecedented success in attracting foreign direct investment, not merely 
to oil the gears of its economic machine – but, indeed, to build the machine itself 
(Mirza, 1986; Pang, 1987; Rodan, 1989; Huff, 1995). Much of this success was 
attributed to development strategies based on state-led, market-driven 
intervention, with the government taking a much heavier role in the city-state’s 
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economic development than usually observed or considered advisable; but yet, in 
the process, gaining an international reputation for corruption-free administration, 
efficient infrastructure, and nonnegotiable legal and financial systems, a 
reputation that has since been one of the main selling points for the island.  
 
However, rising domestic business costs on top of the growing competition 
from emerging economies in the region rendered it imperative for Singapore’s 
economic planners to re-examine and expand the city-state's investment horizons 
(Wong and Ng, 1991; Regnier, 1993); eventually setting the stage for Singapore’s 
participation in the dynamic growth of regional economies such as Vietnam and 
China (SEDB, 1995a, 1995b; Pang, 1995; Okposin, 1999). 
 
The Singapore government’s role as a facilitator and partner is evident from 
the creation of familiar Singapore-havens via industrial parks in neighboring 
countries and the restructuring of tax policies (Singapore Ministry of Finance, 
1993; SEDB, 1993b).  The state also embarked on fostering trusted regional 
networks identical to those within its domestic market, aimed at fostering 
cooperative competition. Implicit in this stratagem was the government’s intent to 
draw on its state enterprise network and extend this network to facilitate business 
ventures in the region (Yeung, 1998; Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998; Pereira, 2000). 
This strategy to remain economically competitive in the global economy has been 
characterized by the building of platforms for national growth through the 
management of strategic alliances with private or semi-private enterprises on 
national economic projects. Theoretically, the ‘vested interests’ within the 
interlinked collaborative system serve to expedite processes, garner exclusive 
incentives, and negate inept bureaucracy (Yeoh et al 2004a).   
   
This industrial regionalization strategy itself is a synergy of state intervention 
policies.  Political leaders, in the initial phase, negotiate the projects’ institutional 
framework that typically involves the garnering of special investment conditions 
in the host locations. They also secure endorsements from host-country 
governments to provide political patronage and protection to the projects.  
Following which, government-led consortia, typically comprising of Singapore 
government agencies and government-linked companies (GLCs), take on the role 
of primary investors in the parks’ development. In the later stages, government 
agencies actively market these projects to Singapore-based multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), on top of the internationalization of Singapore companies.  
 
This paper hence focuses on the created variables of this selective 
intervention, vis-à-vis the location advantages often touted to investors by the 
parks’ partners.  We aim to test if these variables were similarly perceived as such 
by the resultant investors in the parks, and also how they measure up to the 
realities of the host business environments.  In particular we examine the 
differential impact on the various factors on firms with different nature of 
operations and different export markets.  In the following section, we provide a 
brief overview and explanation of the political and historical backgrounds of the 
case-study parks. Thereafter, we detail the methodology of our field research, and 
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present our findings and the preliminary inferences we draw from them; and then, 
with reference to the empirical findings, we discuss the issues and challenges the 
parks face, and finally conclude that, while the parks have achieved some limited 
success, they have been, and remain, vulnerable to the combinations of socio-
political and simple economic factors that radiate from their host environments. 
 
2. Singapore’s Overseas Industrial Parks 
 
Background 
 
Following in the footsteps of the well-documented prototype Batamindo 
Industrial Park (BIP) in Batam (Indonesia), the Vietnam-Singapore Industrial 
Park (VSIP) was conceived in line with Singapore’s prosper-thy-neighbour 
policies, to heighten the development of fellow ASEAN nations.  More 
importantly, the VSIP model also served to replicate confidence in Singapore’s 
success in Batam, in providing another low-cost industrial enclave for Singapore-
based manufacturers to re-distribute their operations.  
 
Unlike VSIP, however, the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP) 
project was a project set out to showcase the Singapore industrial development 
model as well as serve as a source of diplomatic leverage with more populous 
nations. This, in turn, was intended to endorse the perception of Singapore’s 
policymakers that the city-state’s reputation for efficient and transparent 
administration could be marketed to the region. However, the slow progress in the 
initial years resulted in financial losses for the Singapore-led consortium, and also 
for Singaporean investors involved in peripheral projects. In June 1999, it was 
announced that Singapore would transfer 30 percent ownership to the Chinese 
consortium in 2001, retaining only 35 percent share in the project. 
 
Enclaves for Enterprise 
 
Built in the image of the archetypical industrial park, VSIP was constructed to 
be self-contained and self-sufficient, aiming to emulate a manufacturing domain 
similar to that of Singapore’s, procuring prime Singaporean standard and quality 
in a low-income economy, while at the same time offering hassle-free, one-stop 
service – supported, again, by Singapore-style management expertise and 
infrastructure support. To ensure strategic proximity, VSIP is located in Binh 
Duong Province, just 17km north of Ho Chin Minh City, and less than an hour’s 
drive from the international airport and seaport.  A 300,000 working population in 
a 15-km radius also provides a ready talent pool of skilled and low-cost workers.  
Investors in VSIP have priority in employing graduates from the Vietnam-
Singapore Technical Training Centre. 
 
However, unlike BIP, where the concentration on electronics and other light 
industries ties in with the restructuring of Singapore’s manufacturing sector, VSIP 
is less selective in its tenant-profile; the tenant-mix reflects the overpowering 
importance of Asian MNEs (85%), while the sector mix ranges from textiles, to 
 3 
electronics and pharmaceuticals. Singapore and Asian countries are represented 
by various sectors, while Japanese tenants are highly concentrated on electronics. 
VSIP’s major tenants include Konica, Nitto Denko, Kimberly-Clark, Diethelm 
and Roche. VSIP has 138 committed tenants from 21 countries, of which 80 are 
already operational. 
 
CS-SIP was more ambitious, and controversial, as an overseas township 
project. Designed for its projected 360,000 population, the industrious project was 
envisaged to be a balanced environment with state-of-the-art urban facilities. CS-
SIP was designated as the future of commerciality in Suzhou and the surrounding 
areas. The Singapore model, as applied to CS-SIP, promised an administration 
facility with independence from certain governmental ministries, and investments 
in administrative processes (Cartier, 1995). Like VSIP, it was meant to provide 
high-quality infrastructure, ‘one-stop’ and corruption-free operating services, 
minimal regulation, transparent financial charges, and the delivery of social and 
welfare services to support an efficient and co-operative workforce and 
community.  
 
Contrary to the expectations of many pundits, investments began to pour in 
almost immediately after the transfer of ownership to the Chinese partners; by 
June 2001, 193 investment projects worth over US$5.1 billion were recorded. To-
date, CS-SIP has attracted over 1300 foreign companies and 6500 domestic 
companies, accounting for a cumulative contractual foreign investment in 
excess US$16 billion, and cumulative contractual domestic investment of RMB30 
billion, with 75000 jobs created. CS-SIP has established its position as an 
investment hub for Fortune 500 companies; over 75 percent of investment is in 
electronics, information technology and other high-tech segments.  
 
3. Field Research 
 
Analysis of the Singapore-styled parks, relying primarily on secondary data 
from official publications and press reports, is not enough to ascertain the 
situation on the ground. To obtain primary data from the tenants of parks, we 
surveyed the case-study parks on the differential impact of various pull factors on 
firms’ investment decisions, along with the differential impact of different types 
of constraints on their operations. 
 
Methodology: Questionnaire Survey 
 
The questionnaire was designed as a comparative study to investigate the 
various factors influencing firms' investment decisions, along with the problems 
faced by their operations; specifically, to test tenants’ perception of the created 
variables meant to give the parks an advantage, as well as measure said past 
perception against the current reality. The surveys sought to highlight the different 
push/pull factors facing the park tenants when they chose to relocate their 
operations in the respective parks, the operating constraints faced by the 
respective park tenants and the adjustments intended by the tenants in the face of 
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these constraints. The survey focused on four main areas. Firstly, the basic profile 
of the respondent: type of ownership, nature of operations, number of employees, 
sales turnover and its market orientation. Secondly, the factors that attracted the 
respondents to invest in the park. Data on various constraints was gathered in the 
third section, followed by the future plans of the tenants.  
 
Questionnaire surveys were conducted in Vietnam and China from December 
2004 to May 2005. A total of 180 responses were collected from tenant-firms: of 
these, 48 were located in VSIP and the remaining in 132 in CS-SIP. In all cases, 
the surveyed tenants were carefully selected so as to obtain a representative 
distribution of all tenants in the park across both industry and nature of 
operations; the respondents were further reclassified in terms of type of 
ownership, nature of their operations, number of employees, and target markets. 
The surveys were conducted through face-to-face interviews in the case-study 
parks lasting an average of 45minutes, with staff in senior managerial positions or 
above present in all cases, to ensure the response of the selected tenants, and the 
holistic and accurate nature of the obtained responses. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
 
Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and popular rankings on the 
responses relating to factors and constraints, a logit model was applied to compare 
the perceived advantages influencing the tenants’ decision to locate in the case-
study parks. Also, a similar model was also applied to the constraints faced by the 
tenants in these parks.  The logistic regressions draw out the differential impacts 
of the ‘created’ advantages, and operational constraints on the different tenant 
profiles, in particular their different nature of operations and export orientation. 
The logit estimations are set out in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. 
 
Major Factors Influencing Respondents’ Decision to Invest (Table 1) 
 
The immediate, initial, and indeed, unmistakeable observation that one would 
draw from our results is one that might well be surprising to some; surely it does 
not seem likely that the Singapore government would have anticipated, when first 
embarking on the industrial township projects in these two countries, that so many 
of the advantages viewed as the primary attractions to the parks – the location 
advantages of competitive labour costs and overheads, and ‘created’ advantages 
of infrastructure facilities and host government political commitment – would 
prove to be so singularly insignificant to investors. The abovementioned location 
advantages both returned no significant results at all, whereas for the similarly 
abovementioned created advantages, only respondents targeting the domestic 
market in Vietnam returned any significant results for the former as shown by a 
positive and significant α5 (=1.6812), and they were actually comparatively even 
less concerned with it; while the latter only interested Singaporean companies in 
VSIP as evident from a positive and significant α1 (=2.0544), (pointing, perhaps, 
to a certain inclination of viewpoint on the part of Singapore investors about their 
Southeast Asian neighbours, and the significance of the involvement of higher 
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echelons of government in business ventures) and companies exporting their 
products to OECD countries located in CS-SIP, a perhaps natural concern given 
certain political tensions at the time, between the host country and their primary 
export markets. This is seen from the positive and significant α12 (=1.1376).  
More practical economic advantages, instead, held sway; the presence of major 
buyers/suppliers proving a major draw for tenants in VSIP, Singapore-owned and 
joint venture alike; with producers of intermediate products, in particular, finding 
this an important advantage, likely due to the nature of intermediate products as 
being in the middle of the value chain, making linkages on both ends a key issue 
for companies involved in the manufacturing of such products.  We note this 
observation from the positive and significant α1 (=2.2529), α2 (=3.1791) and α4 
(=3.6414). Somewhat surprisingly, though, this does not appear to be a factor of 
particular attractiveness to tenants in CS-SIP, not even to producers of 
intermediate products; owing, perhaps, to the much larger market dimensions 
catered to by a park located in China, both domestic (given China’s size and 
population) and international (given China’s arguably more central location, both 
geographical and psychological, vis-à-vis major international consumers) – larger 
markets reducing the criticality of major buyers/suppliers, given that in such a 
comparatively larger market framework one can always find another buyer or 
supplier. In this context, then, this seeming discrepancy is not so surprising at all. 
 
Rather more surprising and intriguing, instead, are the figures for investment 
incentives – which, while otherwise returning an equal number of positive and 
significant results as presence of major buyers/suppliers, and the most of all the 
factors, also returned negative and significant results for Singaporean firms, in 
both VSIP and CS-SIP, shown by a negative and significant α1 (=-2.2683) and α7 
(=-1.3836). Singaporean firms, it seems, could not care less about the generous 
investment incentives offered by the parks; while this on its own is odd, but not 
by itself that significant, it is unavoidable that one must wonder what kind of 
mindset places an emphasis political commitment from host country and good 
work ethics above more practical economic concerns. Less surprising but 
similarly interesting are the positive and significant results for preferential access 
to target markets among producers of consumer products, and firms targeting the 
domestic market in VSIP; this is evident from the positive and positive α3 
(=1.8326) and α5 (=1.3830). These results suggest two distinct possibilities; the 
first, that most producers of consumer products in VSIP are probably targeting the 
domestic market, and the second, that such firms, for some reason or another, 
seem to expect preferential access to Vietnamese markets. Singapore firms, it 
seems, are not alone in holding certain opinions and expectations of projects 
involving the Vietnamese and Singaporean states. 
 
Major Constraints on Respondents’ Operations (Table 2) 
 
Contrary, perhaps, to some expectations, the constraints felt by respondents on 
their operations proved to be rather stratified, with extremes at both ends and a 
large amount of responses falling squarely in the middle. Among the lower strata 
we find rising labour costs and lack of good supporting services, both constraints 
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heavily highlighted in previous literature, but here returning only negative and 
significant results, and both for firms involved in producing consumer products in 
VSIP as shown by negative and significant β3 = (-1.4230 and -2.1067 
respectively); signalling, perhaps, a growing acceptance of the current state of the 
above two constraints in general, especially among the generally more self-
sufficient and more capital-intensive manufacturers of consumer products. Firms 
targeting the domestic market in both VSIP and CS-SIP, on the other hand, 
returned positive and highly significant results for shortage of R&D personnel, 
evident from a positive and significant β5 (=4.3108) and β11 (=1.9874); while it 
may be somewhat curious why firms targeting a market with an arguably lower 
level of technological sophistication would find a shortage of R&D personnel to 
be a key constraint, when one considers the edge over even local competition that 
R&D provides, and when one additionally considers the generally narrower 
market reach possessed by firms targeting the domestic market, as opposed to the 
ability to import specialized professionals that firms with more internationalized 
business concerns are able to exercise – the need for such personnel becomes 
rather glaringly clear, and it becomes just as clear that local training centres in 
both countries are not yet meeting the demand for R&D professionals; a possible 
area for both park administration and local authorities to look into. 
 
Respondents concerned with the domestic market returned a good number of 
other significant results as well – those in CS-SIP seemed to have experienced 
industrial relations problems of some sort as evident from a positive and 
significant β11 (=1.4790), in all likelihood (given the relative unconcern with such 
problems for firms exporting to OECD nations) to do with local retailers and 
transportation networks, whereas those in VSIP seemed relatively more concerned 
with low labour productivity (a fairly common complaint in VSIP, though in other 
cases not significantly so), relatively less concerned with difficulties in obtaining 
capital equipment – and, perhaps most interestingly, relatively much more 
concerned with protectionistic barriers restricting access to developing countries, 
or more specifically, given their market focus, to Vietnam itself. By itself, this 
would seem to suggest a somewhat self-defeating business attitude taken by the 
Vietnamese government; it is less than economically viable, to say the least, to 
restrict access to one’s own markets, to firms operating within one’s borders, 
interested mainly in selling to one’s citizenry. It is, in fact, so much less than 
intelligent that it is hard to believe this is the case; which, in fact, taken in the 
context of certain ‘advantages’ that were perceived to be present by this same 
demographic, it would seem not to be. Said certain ‘advantages’, of course, refer 
to the expected preferential access to Vietnamese markets mentioned in the 
section above; taken together, then, it would seem that the expressed concern over 
‘protectionistic barriers’ may well simply mean that such firms have not received 
the preferential access that they were expecting. Reputations, after all, are often 
far from reliable gauges of the reputed, be they individuals or collectives. 
 
Other significant figures reflect the situation on the ground; joint-venture 
companies in CS-SIP expressed relative concern over high absenteeism, seen 
from a positive and significant β8 (=1.3133), but were relatively less concerned 
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about industrial relations problems, seen from a negative and significant β8 (=-
1.8793). Singapore-owned respondents in the same park cited, instead, 
protectionistic barriers restricting access to developed countries evident from a 
positive and significant β7 (=1.2478), producing echoes of the political disconnect 
between the Singaporean and Chinese partners that plagued CS-SIP for so long. 
Of far more interest, however, was the fact that several expected major constraints 
failed to produce any significant figures; among them impact of government 
regulations, and competition from other local industrial parks. Neither of the 
above, it seems, bother respondents any more than any other constraint on their 
operations; an intriguing result, given the historically checkered background of 
political support for both VSIP and CS-SIP, and current concerns about the 
development of competing industrial parks in the vicinity of both parks (Yeoh et 
al, 2005). Whether this lack of concern is confidence and security, or mere 
overweening complacency, it is, unfortunately, impossible for us to say. Our 
figures are, regrettably, silent on the issue of the future. 
 
4. Issues and Challenges 
 
Our empirical findings ascertain that the investment-friendly institutional 
framework as laid by the Singapore and host governments, together with the 
presence of major buyers and suppliers, have been generally instrumental in 
engendering a competitive environment within the townships; also, while 
statistically unconcerned with the low-cost competitive environments, and 
Singapore’s infrastructural expertise, it cannot be denied that tenants, in many 
cases, have indeed benefited to various degrees from the above factors. It should 
also be noted that Singapore’s reputation with multinational corporations was, in 
fact, perceived to lend a measure of credibility; some firms, in our interviews, 
pointed to this as a significant factor in their decision to locate within their 
respective parks.  
 
Nonetheless, even the strategically engineered inter-government endorsement 
of the flagship projects, plus the huge amount of resources mobilized through 
these strategic partnerships, have failed to shield the parks from a gamut of all too 
practical problems; and that, in certain cases, these state linkages may have even 
failed to eliminate – even engendered – political pressures on these supposedly 
politically-blessed enterprises. The following observations update, and offer new 
insights, on recent developments in these industrial-township projects.  
 
‘Economics’ of Market Competition 
 
It is a fact that Singapore’s overseas industrial parks are facing mounting 
competition from burgeoning competing parks in their vicinities. VSIP’s 
attractiveness has been eroded by competition from newer industrial estates such 
as the Linh Trung Export Processing Zone, on top of incumbent parks such as the 
Tan Thuan Export Processing Zone. Established by experienced and street-savvy 
developers from Taiwan, China and Thailand, these competitor parks market 
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themselves aggressively on price, charging lower transportation fees accruing 
from more strategic locations. 
 
SIP, likewise, has not been spared the intense competition arising from the 
adjacent Suzhou New District as local officials have chosen to market the latter 
over SIP.  Such competition has somewhat subsided after control over SIP was 
handed over to the Chinese partners, when the interests of the Singapore and local 
stakeholders came into better alignment. Nevertheless, SIP continues to face 
competition from the nearby Pudong New Area and China’s five special 
economic zones in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen and Hainan. These 
industrial centers are part of China’s larger strategy to attract foreign investments 
and thus share similar privileges and political status with SIP.  In recent years, 
these locations have upgraded their industrial structure and management systems, 
rendering themselves increasingly competitive vis-à-vis SIP. The simple 
economics of competition have marginalized the premium attached to the 
‘superior infrastructure’ which was the selling point in all of Singapore’s 
industrial-investment enclaves – infrastructure that our results suggest may not 
have been of any real significance to investors in the first place. The same results, 
it is true, suggest that firms in the two parks seem relatively unconcerned about 
both costs and competitors; it is impossible to tell, however, how much of this 
confidence is deserved – and how much might not be because tenants retain the 
option to shift operations to the abovementioned competitor parks. 
 
Vagaries of Political ‘Allegiances’  
 
The ‘institutional’ framework of the flagship projects in Vietnam and China 
rested heavily on personal ties.  Over time, these have declined due to various 
political and social factors stemming from the host environments. In Vietnam, 
investments in VSIP were expected, in situ, to benefit from Singapore’s ability to 
secure special concessions. These initial expectations now seem roseate, as inter-
government endorsement (in the spirit of ASEAN economic co-operation) has 
proved insufficient to secure similar commitment in the lower tiers of 
government. In VSIP, the influence of local administrators, and their interests in 
competing developments, has compromised the significance of inter-
governmental endorsement of the project. The ‘special’ support from the local 
authorities has proved to be less significant than envisioned.  Improvements on 
infrastructural projects have translated into a plethora of miscellaneous fees, and 
added to operating costs - doubtless a far cry from the aid envisioned by tenants 
who were attracted by the Vietnamese government’s perceived political 
commitment to the project, and from the ‘preferential treatment’ additionally 
expected by certain sectors of the respondents surveyed. Our on-site interviews 
further reveal negative undercurrents over Singapore’s control and management 
of VSIP. Anecdotal evidence suggests that tensions have arisen over the 
Singapore-styled management practices, and these have materialized in 
perception differences, protracted conflicts and project delays.  Although it has 
not blown into a major issue, it is without a doubt a growing one. Local 
sentiments towards the Singapore seem to mirror those expressed in the Suzhou-
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Wuxi experience in China, albeit to a lesser degree. Significantly, SembCorp 
Industries has announced plans to divest itself of part of its stake in VSIP to 
reflect a better ‘alignment of interests’, even as the project is finally registering 
positive returns on its investment (Yeoh and Wong, 2006). 
 
In China, SIP’s progress was initially hampered by an approach that was 
unsuited to the local administrative context.  Although the project was endorsed 
by senior politicians both in China and Singapore, this did not automatically 
translate into cooperation at the lower tiers of government. Instead, local 
authorities chose to promote the existing Suzhou New District, arguably on the 
basis that they had greater ownership in this development as opposed to SIP, 
which Singapore controlled. Since 2001, this misalignment of interests has been 
rectified by the handover of control to the Chinese, and the appointment of key 
officials previously steering Suzhou New District to leadership positions in CS-
SIP.  The park’s managing board is currently jointly headed by Chinese Vice-
Premier Madam Wu Yi and Singapore’s Prime Minster Mr Lee Hsien Loong.  
Such realignment of interests has, at face value, resolved the ‘paradox of context’ 
(Pereira 2003), which encumbered the SIP initiative. However, SIP yet shares the 
political patronage of the Chinese officials with many of its competitors; while 
conflict does not seem on the horizon, it is unlikely that any competitive benefit 
will be derivable from political influences. The political geography, it would 
seem, is even, featureless ground. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The progress of Singapore’s overseas parks over a comparatively short period 
of time indicates the ability of the Singapore’s state enterprise network to 
mobilize economic and political resources to create economic space to maintain 
her economic competitiveness. These projects have obtained special investment 
conditions within their overseas localities, with government endorsements that 
further underscoring its significance. Nevertheless we discover that certain 
complexities of the individual environments, as well as the rude intrusion of the 
economics of competition, have hindered the progress and hobbled the 
commercial effectiveness of the parks; calling, in the larger context, the 
effectiveness of state-linked regionalization into question. 
 
In Vietnam, the additional agenda vis-à-vis CS-SIP was that the host nation is 
a fellow member of ASEAN, and promoting economic development in VSIP was 
one prong of Singapore’s prosper-thy-neighbor policies. This is apparent from the 
mix of ‘targeted’ industries, as well as the park’s management style and 
operations. Not withstanding such objectives, we submit that heightened 
competition and endemic corruption (both the presence of, and lack thereof, in 
different contexts) in the host environment work in tandem to test this strategic 
initiative. The situation for firms exporting to other countries as part of a value 
chain appears to have stabilized, but the same can hardly be said for firms 
concerned with the domestic market, who now seem to facing intensifying 
pressure to outdo local competition, while nursing a measure of discontent over 
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perceived ‘barriers’ and certain unfulfilled expectations. Nonetheless, the park’s 
competitiveness, while dented, is yet intact, and remains a draw to potential 
tenants. We note, however, that said competitiveness remains built largely upon 
economic, and not political, advantages; the latter seeming, indeed, to have been 
more perception than reality. 
 
In China, CS-SIP can be perceived as a strategic thrust by the Singapore 
government to capitalize upon first-mover advantages in a regional economy with 
immense market potential. As the first entrant to develop and manage a state-of-
the-art industrial park, SIP held the potential to enhance Singapore’s reputation 
for infrastructure efficiency and corruption-free administration. More subtly, its 
apparent success would leverage the foray of Singapore companies into China’s 
infrastructure plans and commercial-residential township projects. Following the 
handover to the Chinese partners, CS-SIP has indeed been doing very well for 
itself, as can be seen both from its economic results, and from the upbeat tone of 
the respondents from the park. However, several labour issues remain to be 
resolved – the endemic ‘Singapore-symptomatic’ problem of rising overhead 
costs seem to have gained some acceptance from tenants, but the shortage of 
R&D personnel, persisting domestic industrial relations issues, as well as the 
lurking shadow of growing competition from domestic parks all yet remain; 
minor issues that might as yet balloon into major ones as more and more global 
entrants seek to tap on China’s enormous domestic potential, much as CS-SIP is 
doing. In addition, despite the lifting of political pressures on the park following 
the handover, our findings suggest that a number of social and administrative 
tensions remain present in the park; individually minor, but collectively quite less 
so. 
 
In summary, our findings suggest that, while the underlying theories for 
Singapore’s regionalization stratagem and, pari passu, the strategic advantage 
created for firms within these industrial-townships have revealed undoubtedly 
tangible and remarkable results, these industrial parks nonetheless remain at risk 
from the socio-political contexts and administrative complexities that stem from 
the various host environments. This paper contends that Singapore’s calculated 
and schematized efforts at internationalization, in the framework of transborder 
industrialization, have been overly optimistic, and have more often than not 
frustrated by the abovementioned socio-political intricacies and economic realities 
in the host environments.  Moreover, the Singapore formula, applied to the 
variables of economic competition, in the various economic enclaves has resulted 
in rather deviating conclusions, some positive, and some quite glaringly negative. 
What seems attractive in one context, after all, may be far less attractive in 
another; what works on an island-state relatively free of local competition may 
well run aground in a somewhat more cluttered local competitive landscape. 
Reputation, it seems, really only does go so far. 
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Table 1: Major Factors Influencing Respondents’ Decision to Invest in the Case-Study Parks 
 
 Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park 
 Type of Ownership Nature of Operations Export Market Type of Ownership Nature of Operations Export Market 
 
Singapore 
α1 
Joint- 
Venture 
α2 
Consumer 
Products 
α3 
Intermediate  
Products 
α4 
Domestic 
Market 
α5 
OECD, 
US 
& Japan 
α6 
Singapore 
α7 
Joint- 
Venture 
α8 
Consumer 
Products 
α9 
Intermediate  
Products 
α10 
Domestic 
Market 
α11 
OECD, 
US 
& Japan 
α12 
Infrastructure 
Facilities/support services -34.092 38.32871 0.85253 1.374525 -1.68119 -1.39726 1.142802 -33.3639 38.69813 0.33458 71.38612 0.869838 
  1 1 0.5144 0.3035 0.0553* 0.1573 0.3606 1 1 0.7831 1 0.6102 
Investment Incentives -2.26863 -34.6275 -0.560743 -0.043495 0.689737 1.211173 
-
1.383351 -0.79792 1.637217 0.919603 -0.86296 0.831443 
  0.0592* 1 0.5285 0.9647 0.3706 0.0977* 0.0464** 0.3728 0.0628* 0.0802* 0.1193 0.2261 
Preferential Access to 
target markets 1.003378 -34.3151 1.832554 0.902617 1.383004 0.876424 
-
0.323554 -0.42143 0.499455 0.233388 0.858088 0.064562 
  0.3443 1 0.0647* 0.3787 0.0956* 0.2589 0.5547 0.5624 0.5492 0.6402 0.1088 0.9173 
Competitive labour costs -36.3319 -35.8699 -0.085866 0.641901 -1.07468 0.057393 
-
0.249698 0.910059 1.528546 0.201627 -0.27396 0.112842 
  1 1 0.9361 0.548 0.177 0.944 0.6511 0.2841 0.1739 0.6886 0.6114 0.8577 
Presence of major 
buyers/suppliers 2.252924 3.179184 0.728757 3.641437 0.976095 -0.82235 0.248382 0.361738 -1.310564 0.607686 0.337178 0.294669 
  0.0975* 0.078* 0.5768 0.0277** 0.3304 0.3753 0.6565 0.6252 0.2426 0.2234 0.535 0.6378 
Political Commitment 
from Host Country 2.054431 37.33079 0.26821 1.505559 -0.06530 -0.97553 0.699003 -0.84123 0.265262 0.19646 -0.83206 1.147648 
  0.0402** 1 0.7888 0.2 0.9391 0.2452 0.226 0.453 0.7795 0.7285 0.1392 0.0797* 
Efficient Host Government 
Institution -1.51237 -35.1221 0.218275 0.778989 0.399991 0.1228 
-
0.680843 0.144532 36.57823 -0.498499 0.361234 0.714994 
  0.1996 1 0.8073 0.4256 0.5936 0.8641 0.2481 0.8528 1 0.3191 0.5083 0.2809 
Availability of Raw 
Materials 0.552636 0.124402 -35.14916 -0.598378 -0.59025 -0.04889 
-
0.285668 -34.1680 -33.20261 0.836625 0.18345 1.654264 
  0.6703 1 1 0.6226 0.6253 0.9626 0.7419 1 1 0.2558 0.8318 0.0482** 
Competitive Overheads 0.860538 -33.3457 -0.852513 1.024469 -0.08233 -0.52535 
-
0.321778 -0.48213 1.446411 0.531407 -0.47055 0.541151 
  0.3082 1 0.2783 0.2866 0.9116 0.4397 0.5774 0.5159 0.1982 0.3293 0.4203 0.4235 
Availability of skilled/ 
educated labour -0.27746 -0.12562 -0.991468 -0.120644 0.095871 0.61496 
-
0.017024 -0.89073 -0.128135 0.4555 0.82659 -0.70574 
  0.7443 0.9345 0.2251 0.9067 0.8938 0.3729 0.976 0.2216 0.878 0.3985 0.1202 0.2633 
Good work ethics 1.848656 42.93215 -0.544954 1.293366 0.558738 -0.09567 0.530952 0.421809 0.936394 0.572563 0.302901 0.680402 
  0.0379** 1 0.5257 0.2195 0.5042 0.8964 0.3572 0.5922 0.2638 0.2891 0.611 0.2947 
Presence of major buyers 1.32575 -34.1519 -0.080191 -0.306794 -2.44732 -0.91305 
-
0.289094 -1.20723 0.064793 0.26156 -0.59988 -0.28302 
  0.4338 1 0.9577 0.8653 0.1491 0.4936 0.6378 0.272 0.9435 0.6254 0.2672 0.7021 
 
Source: Questionnaire surveys 
Note: p-values are for two-tailed tests. 
∗ Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 10% level 
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Table 2: Major Constraints on Respondents’ Operations in the Case-Study Parks 
 
 Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park 
 Type of Ownership Nature of Operations Export Market Type of Ownership Nature of Operations Export Market 
 
Singapore 
β1 
Joint- 
Venture 
β2 
Consumer 
Products 
β3 
Intermediate  
Products 
β
 4 
Domestic 
Market 
β5 
OECD, 
US 
& Japan 
β6 
Singapore 
β7 
Joint- 
Venture 
β8 
Consumer 
Products 
β9 
Intermediate  
Products 
β10 
Domestic 
Market 
β11 
OECD, 
US 
& Japan 
β12 
Shortage of semi skilled/ 
skilled labour 0.367461 -0.26466 0.337007 0.119059 -0.40263 0.760934 0.878043 -0.57730 0.216145 -0.519089 0.299076 -0.27866 
  0.6696 0.8612 0.6664 0.9062 0.5782 0.2518 0.1145 0.4979 0.7965 0.3483 0.5979 0.6748 
Shortage of R&D 
personnel -0.03072 1.305566 -0.861253 0.367858 4.310752 0.773143 0.564234 0.465423 -0.458746 0.326925 1.987428 0.261123 
  0.9765 0.6472 0.3958 0.8003 0.0011*** 0.4175 0.4008 0.6056 0.6101 0.5882 0.0005*** 0.7398 
Rising labour costs -0.8654 0.255819 -1.425981 -0.617286 -0.46386 0.05291 0.719124 0.449558 -1.578038 0.69637 -0.08534 -0.62882 
  0.324 0.8659 0.0886* 0.5286 0.5128 0.9357 0.2075 0.5417 0.1633 0.163 0.8732 0.3446 
Low labour productivity -1.11201 33.60969 0.6893 0.714741 1.725369 1.086577 0.631821 0.65701 -0.353451 -0.716518 -0.22116 -0.56420 
  0.2414 1 0.4506 0.5203 0.0488** 0.1803 0.2523 0.3704 0.6689 0.1734 0.6749 0.3836 
High absenteeism 0.007477 37.66229 0.436207 0.118013 0.213377 -0.14928 0.59933 1.313321 0.921606 -0.741725 -0.42853 -0.53816 
  0.9927 1 0.5735 0.8994 0.7628 0.8191 0.3129 0.0812* 0.2724 0.2359 0.453 0.4687 
Industrial relations 
problems -0.52931 -34.6181 1.361532 0.243747 0.518276 -0.1821 
-
0.211971 -1.87931 0.666226 0.985979 1.479032 -0.50816 
  0.6765 1 0.2683 0.8761 0.6029 0.8501 0.7187 0.09* 0.451 0.0674 0.023** 0.4676 
Difficulty in obtaining 
capital equipment 0.03479 1.425245 -1.147336 -1.623442 -2.00474 -0.01978 1.432002 1.397307 -32.5861 -1.029291 -0.51363 -1.65277 
  0.9732 0.4132 0.259 0.1861 0.0334** 0.9798 0.045** 0.1034 1 0.2219 0.4687 0.1518 
Lack of good supporting 
services -1.22891 -31.4822 -2.106696 0.136666 0.214189 0.274624 0.645028 0.429853 -0.231679 0.388496 0.904952 -0.06704 
  0.342 1 0.0903* 0.8906 0.8172 0.7439 0.3307 0.6252 0.8408 0.5274 0.2654 0.9314 
Impact of government 
regulations 0.240915 -33.6471 1.083972 0.520475 0.846209 -0.86265 0.331015 0.081822 -1.324682 -0.48488 0.060055 -0.42225 
  0.7823 1 0.2049 0.6208 0.2819 0.2389 0.5645 0.9154 0.2377 0.375 0.9146 0.5328 
Competition from overseas 
competitors -34.0267 2.635304 -0.345168 0.000893 1.066216 0.249391 0.533383 0.320722 1.3931 -0.039261 1.036238 -0.99215 
  1 0.1567 0.8219 0.9995 0.4254 0.8319 0.392 0.6889 0.1027 0.9475 0.1483 0.2468 
Competition from  other 
local industrial parks 0.294735 -0.28686 0.922621 -0.228437 -1.03709 0.465332 0.834432 0.517882 -0.312162 0.762068 0.671064 -1.41797 
  0.7379 0.8509 0.2534 0.8239 0.1571 0.4888 0.1565 0.4767 0.7077 0.1395 0.2192 0.0492 
Protectionistic barriers:  0.388376 -35.4933 1.330265 1.13519 2.007293 0.057276 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Restricting market access 
to developing countries 0.6562 1 0.1285 0.2699 0.013** 0.9352 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Protectionistic barriers:  -0.30645 0.577418 -0.718773 0.989359 0.278579 0.74446 1.247847 -0.43858 -0.113936 0.321685 0.403809 -0.20098 
Restricting market access 
to developed countries 0.7128 0.711 0.3597 0.3104 0.7004 0.2636 0.0528* 0.5423 0.8925 0.5399 0.4499 0.7625 
 
Source: Questionnaire surveys 
Note: p-values are for two-tailed tests. 
∗ Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 10% level 
